













SURFACE WATER REGULATION IN TEXAS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
Executive Summary  
According to the 2017 Texas State Water Plan, Texas will experience an 8.9 million acre 
foot water shortage by 2070. The question is what role surface and groundwater will play in 
alleviating this shortfall. The 2016 Capstone project to Comptroller Hegar assessed the potential 
for ground water to meet these predicted water needs (the Brady et al. report). This report is a 
follow on report focused on surface water.  
In several ways, surface water poses a more complex task because one cannot point to a 
single regulatory institution with simple fixes. Indeed, in many respects, surface water 
institutions in Texas are relatively sophisticated. From the extensive WAM modeling used by the 
Texas Commission on Environment Quality (TCEQ) to the comprehensive 50-year water plans 
produced by the Texas Water Development Board (TWBD), Texas is significantly ahead of other 
states in their water planning and management. However, our analysis has identified three major 
problem areas, the solutions to which are the focus of this report.  
Our research concludes that the first major problem area is the water planning process 
and the potential problems of planning for an uncertain future. The second  major probem area  is 
that water is under-priced and inflexible during drought periods. This leads to waste and fails to 
incentivize conservation. The last major problem area  is that water is trapped from flowing to its 
most efficient use.  Significant regulatory and legal impediments exist for using surface and 
groundwater conjunctively, for moving surface water between river basins, and even for moving 
surface water within a river basin.  
Solutions to these three major problems lead us to propose a variety of fixes. Regardless 
of other policy options, addressing the planning process should be the first step. We present three 
suggestions to improve the existing planning process.  First, we need to ensure that state/federal 
regulatory barriers are taken into account when weighing the feasibility of  new projects such as 
construction of new reservoirs.  Second, there is a need to consider alterrnative scejarios in the 
water planning process.  Specifically, alternative scenarios should consider (a) the potential for 
more severe droughts due to climate change and (b) the possibility that not all of the 2500+ new 
projects will be completed.  Third, the conflicting criteria for project funding as applied by the  
regional planning groups and the Texas Administrative Code Guidelines utilized by the TWDB 
need to be reconciled.  Using a common set of criteria and explicitly calculating the net present 
value cost-per-acre-foot will enable better choices among alternative projects. 
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Even though addressing the planning process will no doubt improve our performance in 
the future, Texas is underutilizing its existing water resources. We offer  the following two basic 
alternatives:  (1) a water tax that varies monthly across regions and over time in response to 
drought conditions or (2) the creation of an active water market capable of moving trapped water 
and pricing that responds to drought conditions. 
The tax option will fix the underpricing problem and the inflexible nature of water prices 
during droughts. As prices rise, a water tax will encourage conservation, especially in droughts 
when conservation is essential. The proposed tax will vary regionally, monthly, and differentiate 
between agricultural and municipal demands. The tax is based on the Palmer Drought Severity 
Index (PDSI).  Applying a water tax will solve the pricing problem of artificially low and 
inflexible prices.  It allows users to face the cost of the real scarcity of water in their region, 
which will result in water conservation. However, the tax fails to deal with the second problem 
of water being trapped, which prompts us to look to our next alternative.  
Our second option focuses on the creation of a water market in Texas. Unlike the tax, this 
strategy will address both the pricing problem as well as the problem of water being trapped. We 
acknowledge that creating a viable water market is not a simple task. Consequently, we identify 
four essentials steps in creating a water market. The first step is increasing the amount of water 
available for trade. This can be accomplished by introducing price flexibility into river authority 
contracting, lifting regulations on return flows, and amending take or pay contracts to allow 
resale of unused water. The second step involves allowing water transfers between surface water 
and groundwater by relaxing usage restrictions imposed by groundwater conservation districts 
(GCDs) on groundwater and by the TCEQ on surface water diversions. The third step consists of 
increasing inter-basin transfers in the state by eliminating the junior rights provision that limits 
inter-basin transfers. The fourth, and perhaps most challenging step is removing the 
administrative impediments to intra-basin transfers. To address these administrative challenges, 
we offer three options:  (1) speed up the TCEQ permit process, (2) implement more Watermaster 
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I. Introduction 
A. Texas Water Supplies: Adequate Today but Inadequate in Future 
From providing for basic human needs, to satisfying agricultural, industrial and municipal 
demands, water is essential.  In the past, Texas has been blessed with significant groundwater and 
surface water resources. By 2020, it is estimated that total surface water supplies will provide 7.5 
million acre feet (MAF), and groundwater will provide 7.2 MAF per year (TWDB 2017). 
However, predictions suggest that total water supply will decrease from 15.2 MAF per year to 
about 13.6 MAF by 2070, while the demand for water is expected to rise to 21.6 MAF per year, 
leaving the state with an 8.9 MAF annual shortfall (TWDB 2017). Due to the declining 
groundwater availability resources, it is important that this report focus on surface water.    
B.  A Diverse Geography and Regulatory Apparatuses 
 Because of its size and diverse geography, water management in Texas is unique. Western 
regions of Texas have an arid climate, while the eastern part of the state receives plentiful rainfall.  
While the average precipitation rate across the state is 70.9 cm per year, the mean annual 
precipitation increases uniformly from west to east across Texas from 20 to 140 cm (Wurbs 2014). 
For the purpose of surface water management, Texas is divided into 15 rivers basins and eight 
coastal basins. The TCEQ is the primary regulatory agency for surface water.  In addition to 
managing the permit application system for surface water, the TCEQ maintains and updates 
detailed surface water flow models called WAM models for several purposes including 
determining available water rights, future water planning, and managing environmental flows 
(Wurbs 2015).  
As for groundwater, Texas has 9 major aquifers and 21 minor aquifers. Eighty percent of 
Texas is underlain by these aquifers (Wurbs 2014). Regulation of pumping from these aquifers is 
essentially managed by 100+ Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCD) across the state.  These 
insular GCDs have regulatory power over current and future pumping rates.  As explained in the 
2016 Bush School Groundwater Capstone, the projected diminished future availability of 
groundwater may be more of a regulation-induced shortage than a physical shortage (Brady et al 
2016).  
C. Differing Property Rights Govern Ground and Surface Water 
While hydrologically connected through the water cycle, the ownership of surface water 
and groundwater is quite different, leading to separate legal structures.  Compare Texas Water 
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Code Chapter 11 with Id. Chapter 36 (regulating privately owned groundwater). In Texas, 
groundwater is considered private property and owned by the landowner. Nevertheless, GCDs 
wield considerable power over who pumps and how much. In Edwards Aquifer Authority vs. Day, 
the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that landowners have a constitutionally protected real 
property interest in groundwater similar to landowner’s property interest in oil and gas and can 
assert a regulatory takings claim against a GCD. The Texas Legislature has codified this ownership 
in Texas Water Code § 36.002. 
Unlike groundwater, surface water is owned by the state and regulated by the TCEQ. The 
primary legal doctrine that governs surface water pumping is the prior appropriation doctrine, 
which introduces the idea of “first in right, first in time”. This means that water rights issued at an 
earlier point in time have priority over water rights issued at a later date. In the event that a senior 
right holder’s entire allocation is unavailable, a junior right holders allocation may be curtailed 
(Jarvis 2016). 
D. The Texas Water Development Board Oversees New Surface Water Projects 
Every five years, the Texas Water Development Board publishes a state water plan 
containing a comprehensive guide for water management1. The 2017 Texas Water Plan intends to 
deal with the projected 8.9 MAF water shortage by increasing the amount of surface water 
available. Increasing new surface water supplies account for about 45 percent of the total 
recommended water management supply strategies in the Plan (TWDB 2017). Such strategies are 
essential to implement in the future to ensure the reliability of water sources for the future. Water 
management strategies allow planners to reduce the risk of streamflow variances and measure 
water storage capacity and future source reliability. Among these strategies, are proposals for 
increased use of reservoirs.  
There are issues with relying heavily on new reservoirs for increased water supplies. 
Reservoir evaporation rates are immense. Work by Wurbs and Ayala found the mean evaporation 
from the 3415 reservoirs in the Texas water rights permit system was 7.53 billion cubic meters per 
year. In 2010, that volume of evaporative losses was equal to 61% of total agricultural or 126% of 
total municipal water use (Wurbs 2013). As temperatures rise, so do evaporation rates. 
Furthermore, reservoirs are directly dependent on rainfall, whereas groundwater is not as directly 
dependent on current rainfall. 
                                                     
1 Texas Water Code § 16.051 
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E. Absence of a Functioning Water Market Poses More Difficulties 
There is no functioning water market in Texas capable of reacting to short term fluctuations 
in supply and demand, except for the Lower Rio Grande Watermaster System.2  The severe drought 
of 2011 exposed this fact. Most Texas counties saw a 25% drop in their annual precipitation rates 
(Nielson-Gammon 2011). By October of 2011, 88% of Texas was classified to be in an exceptional 
drought according to the Palmer Drought Severity Index (Nielson-Gammon 2011). Even though 
precipitation rates and water supplies across the state were at an all-time low, water did not move 
from less drought prone areas to the driest regions.  Additionally, the price of water did not rise.  
The famous law suit by the Texas Farm Bureau against the TCEQ exposed the absence of 
a market.3  Because of regulatory constraints farmers with senior diversion permits could not sell 
their surface water allocations to junior rights users such as municipalities and power plants. With 
no ability to trade water, the TCEQ responded by authorizing these lower priority municipalities 
and power plants to pre-empt the ability of the senior rights holders to divert surface water as an 
emergency action to maintain these vital uses. While ultimately the Courts ruled that the TCEQ 
pre-emption was not legal, this whole episode occurred because of the lack of a viable water 
market.  If irrigators with senior rights could have leased their senior appropriations on a temporary 
basis to water-starved municipalities, they would have done so. A viable water market would have 
avoided both putting the TCEQ in the awkward position of ignoring the long recognized prior 
appropriations doctrine, and the lawsuit.  
The absence of a viable water market in Texas is a serious concern.  If there is no scarcity 
premium of water reflected in its price, few incentives exist to conserve and move water from low 
value uses to high value uses.  The absence of a water market traps water both geographically and 
usage wise. Because water cannot flow to its most efficient use, there is little incentive to conserve 
one’s supply. As we shall see, there are a number of reasons why we do not have a viable water 
market.  There is no one single culprit.   
F.  Resumption of Rainfall should not result in Complacency 
While talk of reforms and markets were sparked during this drought, they quickly 
dissipated shortly after precipitation rates increased in 2012 and returned to normal thereafter 
                                                     
2 Some might argue that since river authorities and municipalities engage in long term contracts, this is evidence of a market.  But an active 
market requires more than long term contracts, it must be able to respond to short term fluctuations in supply and demand. 
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(McDonald 2016).  Now, we should not become complacent to address these issues of surface 
water management. Rather than waiting until the next major drought and rush into ill-conceived 
fixes, we have the luxury of approaching these issues in a thoughtful, deliberate manner. This 
report focuses on several areas in which surface water policy can be improved and provides 
possible solutions to the problems. 
G.  Special Thanks  
In the process of completing this year long project, we would especially like to thank the 
many contributors whose advice and guidance were crucial to completion of our project. Through 
classroom presentations and phone interviews, these people shared with us their expertise on 
surface water issues. Our criteria in seeking outside help was to look for expertise both inside and 
outside the state government.  Also, to get a flavor for the various stakeholder interests, we 
solicited input from a variety of groups.  Needless to say, these individuals are not responsible for 
the content of this report, nor do they necessarily concur with its policy prescriptions. Special 
thanks are due the following: Toby Baker (Commissioner, TCEQ), Michael J. Booth (attorney, 
Booth, Ahrens & Werkenthin), Charlie Flatten (Hill Country Alliance), James Fletcher (Texas 
Water Future), Bob Harden (RW Harden & Associates), John Hoffman (LCRA), Ed McCarthy 
(attorney, McCarthy & McCarthy), Carlos Rubinstein (RSAH2O), Amy Settemeyer  (TCEQ),  
Haskell Simon (rice farmer), Kathleen  White (Texas Public Policy Foundation), Professor Kirk 
Winemiller (Texas A&M Wildlife and Fisheries Science), Professor Ralph Wurbs  (Texas A&M 
Hydrology Department).  
 
II.  The Three Fundamental Problems of Surface Water Regulation in Texas 
   Too often by focusing on the problems, we fail to mention the successes of Texas surface 
water policy.  So let us briefly recount the positives.  First, property rights are well-defined under 
the prior appropriation doctrine.  This means that while the State owns the water, individual permit 
holders enjoy a legal system that protects their rights.  Second, Texas is a leader in the science of 
surface water modelling through its WAM modelling effort. Third, the TCEQ brings an impressive 
array of technical expertise to the difficult tasks of overseeing the granting of permits and 
monitoring environmental quality.  Finally, the TWDB provides planning over a 50-year horizon 
and attempts to devise incentives to expand water infrastructure. 
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With appreciation for these achievements, let us briefly list three major problem areas 
whose solutions animate this report: 
1. There are certain areas for improvement in the State Water Plan. Even though 
Texas is a leading state in its preparation of a detailed forward looking 50-year State Water Plan, 
there are issues that provide opportunity for improvement. Moreover, these problems are relatively 
solvable. 
2. The second major problem area is water allocation.  The state has abundant water 
resources—both surface and groundwater—in certain locations where they are being relatively 
underutilized.  If low-cost mechanisms can be found to move water to the areas of greater need, 
Texas can avoid high cost alternatives like seawater desalination. It is useful to think of improving 
water allocation through three avenues: (1) conjunctive use of ground and surface water (2) 
reallocation of water resources within a river basin and (3) reallocation of surface water between 
river basins.   
3. Surface water in Texas is underpriced and inflexible in the face of droughts. The 
current pricing system does not include a scarcity premium for raw water.  Gold commands a 
scarcity premium far in excess of the basic cost to mine and refine the ore. Yet, Texas surface 
water, a far more essential resource, commands no such scarcity premium.  Especially during a 
drought, it is critical for prices to rise encouraging conservation. 
 
A. Problem Area One: The Planning Process and SWIFT Funding   
The TWDB State Water Planning Process is praised by water planners nationwide, and 
since the adoption of a regionally-based, bottom-up approach in 1997 the gap between planning 
and implementation has shrunk (Bruun, 2017, 3). This bottom-up approach allows for the input of 
hundreds of stakeholders, planning group members, and consultants, which results in a 
comprehensive approach to water planning (Bruun, 2017, 4). The implementation and allocation 
of SWIFT Funding, which subsidizes water infrastructure improvements, now depends on their 
inclusion in the State Water Plan. Thus, the State Water Plan matters now more than ever.  Despite 
these achievements, there are shortfalls in the current state water planning process that cannot be 
ignored and are easily addressed.  
The TWDB State Plan identifies 2,500+ water management projects designed to satisfy the 
majority of the projected 8.9 MAF shortage. However, even when taking into the consideration 
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the implementation of every one of these projects, the state still expects to fall short of its needed 
supply by 2070 (TWDB State Water Plan 2017, 11). While the TWDB believes that over 30% of 
the 8.9 MAF shortage can be addressed by using “demand management” strategies such as 
irrigation and municipal conservation, new forms of infrastructure must also be constructed.  Of 
the 8.9 million AF of additional annual supply needed to meet future needs, new reservoirs will 
account for 14%, or approximately 1.15 million AF, with only 1.3% being attributed to future 
groundwater desalination projects and 1.8% to new aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) facilities 
(TWDB State Plan 2017, A-8). This highlights that the TWDB prioritizes the construction of 
reservoirs over other forms of technology such as ASR and desalination.  
Problem 1.1:  The Over Reliance on New Reservoir Construction without concern for Feasibility  
 The last major reservoir to be constructed in Texas was Jim Chapman Lake, now referred 
to as Cooper Lake. This reservoir provides water for the North Texas Municipal Water District, 
the Sulphur River Municipal Water District, and the city of Irving (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
[USACE]. The first feasibility study for the reservoir was requested in 1948, but construction was 
not completed until 1991, a full 43 years later (USACE). Despite the fact that a major reservoir 
has not been built in a quarter of a century, and the fact that Cooper Lake took over forty years to 
become a reality, the State Water Plan still calls for the construction of twenty-six new reservoirs 
by 2070 (TWDB State Water Plan, A-108). Since the 1990s, regulations pertaining to reservoirs 
(put into place by both federal and state governing agencies, such as the EPA, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, and the TCEQ) have only gotten more stringent.  It appears unrealistic to believe that 
over twenty-five major reservoirs will be built in the next 50 years.  Still, the ability to meet future 
water needs throughout the state is highly dependent on the construction of these reservoirs.  
Problem 1.2: Lack of Consideration for Alternative Scenarios 
This problem is twofold. Firstly, future water availability models are based on the drought 
of record and this system runs off of the assumption that the drought of record will repeat itself in 
the future (TWDB State Water Plan, A-3). However, weather is unpredictable, and may be 
becoming more unpredictable due to climate change. The state of Texas may very well experience 
a drought that lasts longer or is worse in severity than our drought of record.  It is important to 
develop contingency plans for such a situation.   
Secondly, this problem is compounded by the assumption that the 2,500+ water 
management projects outlined in the State Water Plan will be implemented (TWDB State Water 
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Plan 2017). Even with the implementation of all water management projects, it is projected that 
the state will still fall almost half a million acre feet short of water demands by 2070 (TWDB State 
Water Plan 2017).  Meeting future water demand throughout the state will require adaptation and 
contingency planning, which while being done in some regions, is not a point of emphasis in the 
current State Water Plan. 
Problem 1.3:  Conflicting Criteria for Selection of SWIFT fund projects  
While making water funds available through the SWIFT is beneficial the implementation 
of SWIFT funding raises concerns. The process by which SWIFT Fund applications are prioritized 
is highly complex; yet inconsistencies in the process seem clear. First, the regional planning groups 
utilize what is referred to as the “Uniform Standards4” to rank the projects included in their regional 
plan.5 The TWDB then utilizes its own criteria and ranking system6 when considering SWIFT 
Fund allocation, which is considerably different from the Uniform Standards utilized by the 
regional planning groups. It is unclear as to why the standards used by the TWDB and the 
regionally planning groups are not the same, and how conflicting evaluations are resolved. In 
addition, neither ranking system takes into account vital concerns related to water infrastructure 
projects. While the Uniform Standards attempt to judge the feasibility of a water infrastructure 
project, the environmental concerns that could serve to have a substantial impact on the feasibility 
of an option do not appear to be considered.   
Curiously, the standards seem rather arbitrary and subject to manipulation in favor of 
certain politically favorable projects. The Uniform Standards allocate 40% of the weight to 
“Decade of Need,” but there is no criteria included as to how that estimate is calculated. 
Meanwhile, the TWDB ranking system makes no mention of the Decade of Need in its calculation, 
despite the fact that the regional planning groups assign the most weight to that consideration. The 
project viability criteria takes into account whether or not the project is the “only economically 
feasible source of new supply,” but yet again, provides no instructions for how this is calculated 
(HB 4 Stakeholder Committee, 14). Overall, the allocation and ranking process seems to be highly 
prone to inaccuracies. Furthermore, there exists a fundamental disconnect between the systems 
                                                     
4 https://www.twdb.texas.gov/financial/programs/swift/doc/HB_4_SHC_Uniform_Standards.pdf 
5 The conflicting criteria emanated from HB-4, which created SWIFT. To provide consistent criteria would require 
legislative reconciliation of the two. 
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utilized by the regional planning committees and the TWDB headquarters. A final criticism is that 
in comparing alternative sources of water, costs appear to play a minor role in the choice of projects 
to fund.   
 
B. Problem Area 2: Texas has a Water Allocation Problem 
A continuous argument within the water policy community and academic literature 
highlights that there is not a water shortage problem, per se, but rather a water allocation problem 
(Ashworth, 2011). The eastern regions of Texas have abundant surface water supplies, while the 
western regions are more arid and vulnerable to droughts. Likewise, in some areas there are prolific 
aquifers and limited surface water; yet there is little conjunctive use of the two. This section 
addresses impediments under the current system that contribute to the surface water allocation 
problem. We categorize them as inability to transfer (a) groundwater and surface water (b) surface 
water within a river basin, and (c) surface water between river basins.  
Problem 2.1: Limited Transfers between Groundwater and Surface Water  
Texas water policies fail to recognize the relationship between groundwater and surface water 
(Kaiser 2011)7. There are two main arguments to support merging surface water and groundwater 
policies. First, is the inherent hydrological interconnection between surface and groundwater. 
Second, from a user’s perspective, groundwater and surface water are economic substitutes to one 
another. Current regulation fails to recognize these facts, treating the two as separate entities. It is 
important to emphasize that for most water uses, like municipal, industrial and agricultural uses, 
there is no major quality difference between surface water and groundwater, the choice of which 
one to utilize should fall almost exclusively on cost.  Even though the State owns the surface water 
and landowners own the ground water, there is no inherent reason that regulatory constraints 
should prevent their substitution. 
a. As a long-term supply alternative:  Transfers from abundant Groundwater aquifers 
to Surface Water 
Where surface water is limited, there is a need to increase long term water supplies to meet 
the increased demand from economic and population growth. Where groundwater is abundant, an 
increased use of groundwater is an efficient way to increase water supply in the long term at a 
                                                     
7 Surface water is state owned and allocated under the prior appropriation doctrine. Groundwater is privately owned, historically allocated under 
the rule of capture, and regulated by local groundwater conservation districts (Kaiser 2011). 
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lower cost than other alternatives. For these aquifers, the current regulation of groundwater by 
GCDs restricts the supply of groundwater to an inefficient level.  Brady et. al (2016) found that 
even at increased pumping rates, for five of the nine largest aquifers, many years of supply would 
be available before reaching 50% of an aquifer’s storage capacity (Brady et al, 2016).  Compared 
to the costs of new surface water reservoirs and desalination, groundwater in these aquifers is a 
low-cost alternative8 to be utilized first before transitioning to high cost alternatives.   
b.   As a short term drought expedient: Transfers of Groundwater 
Even in the case where groundwater is not an abundant long term supply source, there is a 
rationale for an emergency conjunctive use of groundwater with surface water supply sources to 
alleviate short term supply problems. During a drought, surface water is much more vulnerable to 
the lack of rainfall than groundwater.  Surface water becomes increasingly scarce leaving a gap 
between the demand for surface water and its supply. Currently, there is no policy that incentivizes 
groundwater owners to react to droughts by increasing groundwater pumping. Usage-based GCD 
regulations effectively preclude an irrigator from selling his groundwater to a nearby municipality 
or power plant whose surface water is facing curtailment or depletion.  
Problem 2.2: Inadequate Intra-basin Transfers  
Transfers of water within a river basin face several regulatory impediments.  Water 
transfers are defined as “a voluntary agreement that results in a temporary or permanent change in 
the type, time or place of use of water and/or a water right” (Water Transfers of the West, 2012). 
Interestingly, the infrastructure to support water transfers exists, particularly within a river basin, 
because the river and its tributaries provide a natural water highway. However, there are several 
impediments that prevent these highways from being utilized by water right holders and other 
entities. 
 The primary impediment to transfers within a river basin is the complicated regulatory 
process imposed by the TCEQ in its effort to comply with legislative and legal constraints. 
Currently, potential buyers are not as likely to buy a water right if they need to make permit 
modifications, such as a change in location of diversion, rate, or use of the water. The bureaucratic 
process in place is time consuming and expensive for potential buyers and sellers.  
                                                     
8 It is important to consider that transportation costs may be a limiting factor for both surface and groundwater project development.  
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The amendment process requires the TCEQ to perform a technical review using the WAM 
dataset to see how the amendment will affect water right holders in the basin. Then the TCEQ will 
publish notice of the proposed water right amendment(s) to potentially affected parties within the 
basin. Water right holders and other affected persons and entities then have the authority to request 
a public hearing. If a 30-day period passes without receipt of an objection, then the TCEQ may 
complete the application without holding a public hearing (Caroom and Maxwell, 2013).  
This amendment process is particularly troublesome during a drought when permit holders not 
using their full allocation would like to lease (temporarily sell) their water to another party at a 
different diversion point. As surface water becomes scarce and demand for water expands, the 
inability to easily transfer water rights (either by short term leases or outright sales of water rights) 
limits the market from allocating water to its highest value uses. In turn, the constraint on transfers 
limits conservation from taking place by encouraging users to “use it or lose it”. Senior right 
holders that fail to use their diversion each year effectively lose it to downstream junior right 
holders. 
Problem 2.3: Restrictions on Interbasin Transfers  
According to former TCEQ Commissioner and TWDB Chairman, Carlos Rubinstein, Texas 
will not be able to fix its water problems until we can successfully move water from “where it is, 
to where it is not” (Personal Communication, January 16, 2017). One way to do this is through 
interbasin transfers, moving water from abundant areas in East Texas to Central and West Texas. 
A major issue that arises when discussing interbasin transfers is the junior rights provision.  The 
Texas Water Code states, “If an amendment is made to the water right to effectuate an interbasin 
transfer of water for a term, the affected portion of the water right shall be junior to all existing 
water rights in the basin of origin only for the term of the amendment.”9 The provision 
disincentives a water market from appearing, because it devaluates the water right. When a transfer 
outside of the basin occurs, the value of the water is greatly diminished due to its resultant junior 
priority date. For example, a buyer would not want to invest in a costly pipeline that might only 
be used a fraction of the year, or only during very wet years, when junior right holders can divert.  
Since the Legislature enacted the so-called “junior rights provision” in 1997, the number of 
interbasin transfers has declined significantly (Neeley, 204, 2). For example, after the junior rights 
                                                     
9 Texas Water Code § 11.085. 
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provision was implemented there was an approximate 500,000 AF decrease in the volume of water 
utilized for interbasin transfers (Votteler, Alexander and Moore 2006). 
C.  Problem Area 3: Water Prices are Artificially Cheap and Inflexible 
A reoccurring theme within the literature and our surface water policy research revolves 
around the underpricing of water in Texas (Griffin, 2011). This section seeks to highlight how 
water is being underpriced and how that inhibits water conservation and innovation. Within this 
problem, we identify five contributing factors giving rise to the underpricing of surface water.  
Problem 3.1: No scarcity premium for raw water 
 A serious problem in surface water is that prices do not register a scarcity premium like we 
observe for other resources. Thus, raw surface water is priced artificially low. To illustrate the 
magnitude of underpricing in surface water, groundwater pumping rights in the Edwards Aquifer 
are routinely traded and the party leasing the water may pay between $100 to $250 per AF per year 
under a lease depending on the buyers and sellers (Edwards Aquifer Authority, Water Transfer 
Data, 2016). This pricing reflects the true scarcity premium of the raw water before the buyer adds 
the costs of transporting, treating, and distributing the water.  
The reason that surface water prices do not include any scarcity premium is largely the 
result of limited opportunities to trade surface water rights.   River authorities typically control the 
bulk of diversion permits within a river basin.  As quasi-governmental entities, river authorities 
are constrained to charge rates that only recover their costs. Those costs do not include any scarcity 
premium for the water that they acquired many years ago. Another contributing factor is that TCEQ 
approval process for changes in points of diversions are costly and time consuming.  Thus, there 
is limited opportunity for development of a market like there is in the Edwards Aquifer to 
automatically register the scarcity premiums associated with water.  
Problem 3.2: Current wholesale and retail water prices based on historic costs  
Whether for raw water sold by river authorities or potable water provided by 
municipalities, the prices are based on the historical costs of building the infrastructure.  
Unfortunately, because these historical costs are far below the current costs of replicating either 
the resource or the necessary infrastructure, they do not incorporate the scarcity premium of raw 
water. 
Water prices shown by the wholesale water rates illustrate this problem. A good example 
of a river authority provider is the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA). The LCRA provides 
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firm long-term water contracts, ten-year term contracts, and interruptible water contracts for raw 
water (LCRA, 2017). In 2011, LCRA’s rate for raw water was $151 per acre-foot and this price 
remained constant throughout the year, despite the drought of record. Clearly, there is a need to 
develop price flexibility to deal with such situations, as to encourage conservation during a drought 
periods. 
Moving down the supply chain are water wholesalers who purchase raw water at some 
diversion point, treat it, and deliver it to local municipalities. They are likewise subject to regulated 
rates-- using traditional rate of return regulation.10  
The presence of regulated rates for the transportation, treatment, and local delivery of water 
is a good thing by protecting consumers from the exercise of monopoly power by wholesale 
providers.  Nevertheless, a by-product of this regulatory scheme is that prices are inflexible and 
based on historical costs which tend to not reflect current costs. Even within a regulated price 
system it is possible to introduce price flexibility. For example, in regulated electricity markets 
peak-load pricing is applied to curtail usage during extreme conditions, similar approaches could 
be applied for surface water during drought conditions.  
Problem 3.3: Inflexible prices that don’t respond to droughts 
The inability of the price of wholesale water to fluctuate in response to drought conditions 
is an impediment to efficient water usage throughout Texas. The price of wholesale water contracts 
in Texas set by Texas river authority providing the water typically includes a flat fee, which is 
invariant of consumption, and a volumetric fee, which is dependent on how much water is used 
(Griffin, 2011).  For example, Figure 1 shows the regulated rate charged by LCRA to its municipal 
customers over the period 2010 to 2016.  Figure 1 also shows the PDSI drought index showing the 
most severe drought in history in 2011.  Note that LCRA’s prices, which were based solely on its 
own historical costs, showed no response to the drought.  Therefore, the contract price does not 
change in accordance with changes in drought conditions. In a well-functioning water market 
(even if operation, maintenance, and capital costs remained the same), if water became more 




                                                     
10 Texas Water Code, § 13.016 
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Problem 3.4: Take-or-Pay Contracts actually encourage overuse during droughts 
Long-term “take or pay” contracts give no incentive to municipalities and other users, even 
during droughts, to conserve water. Whether they consume all of their allocated water or not, users 
are charged for the specific amount of water by wholesale water suppliers. Suppliers concern is 
their guaranteed stable revenue over water conservation. Paradoxically, cities purchasing water 
with “take or pay” provisions do not want their customers to conserve as this would lead to less 
city revenues from water sales and the inability to cover the cost of their “take or pay” contract. 
For example, NTMWD requires cities to purchase a maximum amount of water annually, 
regardless of whether the city uses the entire amount of water. Four cities, Garland, Mesquite, 
Plano, and Richardson, arranged a petition seeking a review of their water rates because together 
they paid $178 million for water they didn’t use (Plano n.d.). Take or pay contracts provide few 
incentives to conserve. Municipalities find themselves better off taking their whole allocated 
amount of water under the contract even if they do not absolutely need it. This allocation 
inefficiency creates a vicious cycle by increasing demand for water during droughts, which 
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Problem 3.5: Pricing return flows at zero further reduces supplies during droughts 
 Another significant problem area regarding surface water management in Texas is return 
flows. The TCEQ defines return flows as the portion of state water diverted from a water supply 
and beneficially used which is not consumed as a consequence of that use and returned to a body 
of water (TCEQ, 2016). While this concept may initially sound straightforward, indirect reuse (i.e. 
return flows released to a river) has been “the subject of regulatory confusion for many years” 
(Bradsby 2016). While some state policies encourage users to reuse their water, return flows are 
often not included in the right permits (Wurbs, 2015).  This means that when the permit holder 
returns the water to the river, the returned water becomes state property subject to re-appropriation.  
The owner receives no compensation for the return flow and thus has little incentive to return the 
water for use downstream. 
As previously mentioned, the 2017 State Water plan calls for 14 percent of total water 
supplies to come from reuse management strategies, and 7.6 percent will come specifically from 
indirect reuse.11To achieve this goal of increasing water supplies for reuse, several aspects of return 
flows policy must be reformed. When water users discharge and abandon any effluent into a river 
or stream, it becomes state water, available for appropriation. Texas Water Code contains 
provisions to allow groundwater users to maintain ownership of their groundwater-based return 
flows through TCEQ authorization. 12 By requiring TCEQ approval of the use of the watercourse 
to maintain ownership of return flow it devalues the private property right intrinsic to groundwater.  
Another issue surrounds return flows from surface water. If a permittee does not have 
provisions for reuse included in their water right, they may seek amendments to the water right. 
Because a permit amendment can change the priority date for a reuse permit based on the 
characteristics of the permit, right holders may become junior rights as to the volume of reuse 
water, and thus discouraged from seeking access to their return flows in light of the time and cost 
associated with securing the amendment. If a permit amendment significantly changes the permit 
priority date for the reuse, then some dischargers may avoid this process altogether as a more junior 
priority date is subject to greater restrictions during times of drought and for environmental flows 
may limit the utility of the amendment. These administrative requirements discourage users from 
                                                     
11 2017 Texas State Water Plan p. 9; Indirect reuse is defined as water returned to state waterways and then extracted for a beneficial use, while 
direct reuse is defined as effluent water piped directly to a wastewater treatment center to a beneficial use   
12 Texas Water Code §11.042b  
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marketing their discharged water. If return flows have no value, there is little incentive to 
encourage their use. 
 
III.  Solutions 
In this section of the report, we will present solutions to the three identified problem areas. 
The first solution is to improve the planning process. We argue this must be done before looking 
to solve other problems. This is a necessary step to ensure efficient water management for future 
generations. Even if all of these solutions to the planning process are implemented, we are left 
with the problems of how to best utilize the existing supplies of surface water. We propose two 
separate solutions.  The first describes how a water tax could work and what problems it could 
solve.  The second considers creating a water market and its complexities. Figure 2 serves as a 
roadmap to our proposed solutions.  









SURFACE WATER REGULATION IN TEXAS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. Improving the Planning Process 
Despite having a well-respected and comprehensive water plan, the water planning process 
and SWIFT funding allocation have areas for improvement. In response to the problems 
enumerated above, we propose three basic suggestions. 
1. Ensure that unrealistic projects showing little to no progress towards implementation 
are not continually relied upon in planning.  
Water management projects from previous plans that have not yet been implemented can 
continue to be recommended in future Plans. The 2017 State Water Plan surveyed project sponsor 
implementation and found that only 7% of project sponsors reported implementation13 (TWDB 
State Water Plan 105). 14 While these surveys are useful, they should become a larger priority, and 
implementation information of strategies introduced in earlier state water plans should also be 
included, not just those in the prior plan. The Texas Water Code should be amended to include a 
provision stating that a water management strategy that has not shown progress towards 
implementation after a certain number of years should be removed from consideration and viable 
alternatives must be developed.  
This provision would allow the Water Management Strategies project to be more realistic, 
especially when it comes to reservoir construction. There are currently over 5,000 water 
management strategies. Now that so many have been put forward we should begin to shift focus 
towards their implementation.  
 In addition, the uniform standards utilized by the regionally planning groups should be 
amended to address this issue. Currently, the feasibility rating of a project only concerns the 
availability of water rights and the scientific/hydrological practicality. Missing is a consideration 
for regulatory barriers that effect a project’s implementation. For example, a measure of 
environmental impact could be included in the uniform standards as a way of assessing potential 
implementation struggles.  
 
 
                                                     
13 66% of those contacted provided no information on progress, 20% showed no implementation at all, 7% showed progress towards 
implementation, and only 7% were implemented 
14 According to the TWDB “Progress toward implementation” includes “start of project construction or pre-implementation activity such as 
negotiating contracts, applying for and securing financing or state and federal permits, or conducting preliminary engineering studies” or “achieve 
of a portion of the total anticipated conservation savings” – Page 105.  
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2. Make alternative scenario and contingency planning a priority in all regions to 
address risk and uncertainties in future supplies  
While the State Water Plan acknowledges that the feasibility of the implementation of 
projects depends on “political and financial process.” However, according to the 2017 plan, only 
some of the planning groups have recommended strategies beyond drought of record conditions to 
address risks and uncertainties such as more rapid population growth, system failure, and failure 
to implemented recommended strategies into in the planning process (TWDB 2017 Plan, 10-11). 
This type of alternative scenario planning must be a priority in all regions, especially due to the 
fact that implementation of strategies is lacking and that scientists and records indicate that areas 
of the state could exceed the drought of record in the future (TWDB 2017 Plan, 39).  
In response to the 2011 drought, each region  includes a section on drought response plans 
(TWDB 2017 Plan, 31-39).15,16 This has made the TWDB planning process more responsive and 
aware of planning for droughts, but this same type of risk and uncertainty planning could and 
should be expanded to include other scenarios, such as more rapid population growth and the 
failure to implement water management projects in the estimated time frame.  
3. Further improvements to the SWIFT funding criteria should include efforts to 
increase consistency and net present value calculations of costs per acre foot.  
Projects eligible for SWIFT funding are ranked twice: once by the regional planning group 
and then again by the TWDB’s central office. As described in the previous section, the style and 
criteria of the ranking systems are quite different. Uniformity of criteria would allow for more 
accurate comparisons between the two, which would serve to help ensure that each entity is being 
honest and impartial with their rankings.   
The State Water Plan should calculate the net-present value of water supply for the 
alternative projects being considered. Comparing the net present value of cost-per-AF would allow 
for the comparison of projects which may provide differing amounts of water, and have different 
time tables for construction. Discounting allows us to consider the time value of money, and is 
used to find the net present value of an infrastructure project that will have both costs and benefits 
                                                     
15 This section includes information such as current and planned responses to drought, triggers for drought contingency plans, and identifying 
alternative sources for municipalities relying on a single source of supply. 
16 For example, water suppliers were faced with a hypothetical situation in which they only had 180 days of water supply left in a time of drought, 




SURFACE WATER REGULATION IN TEXAS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
(in this case, water supply), years into the future. The higher the discount rate, the more emphasis 
that is placed on the present as opposed to the future (Shaw, 2005, 60-61). 
 For example, Table 3.1 shows a simple comparison of two projects: Project A and Project 
B. Once constructed, Project A will provide 600 thousand AF per year, but would not be completed 
for 20 years. Project B will provide only 300 thousand AF per year, but will be constructed by year 
8. The cost of each project also varies: early on Project A will cost less than Project B per year 
since Project B will be constructed earlier, but between years 12 and 20 Project A is substantially 
more expensive than Project B. Utilizing net present value analysis can help us compare the cost 
of each project. With a discount rate of zero, Project A is the clear winner, as the cost per acre-
foot is much lower than Project B. However, at a .05 discount rate, Project B is the better option. 
At a .03 discount rate,  
Project A is only slightly more cost effective.. This method allows us to compare the present value 
of two projects with considerably different costs and capacities. Discounting allows for a 
consideration of how much we value the present relative to the future.  
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Source: Capstone Estimations  
B. Policy Solutions for Water Under-Pricing and Misallocation  
As previously stated, we have both a water pricing problem as well as a water allocation 
problem.  To address the problem that water prices are artificially cheap and inflexible during 
droughts, we first propose a water tax that would vary across regions and vary monthly depending 
on rainfall.  We then propose the option of creating a water market, which would be designed to 
deal both with the pricing problem of water and the allocation problems. 
 
C. Regional Water Taxes:  that varies with water availability by region.  
A water tax is designed to address the problem that water prices are artificially cheap and 
inflexible during droughts. First, the water tax can solve the lack of a scarcity premium because it 
would vary with water availability by region, and can be altered by the State accordingly to address 
long-term water needs. Second, as the value of the tax will automatically vary with monthly water 
availability, it will increase water prices during droughts. Thus, a water tax will act as a water 
scarcity signal and create incentives to conserve. In fact, Olmstead et al (2009) suggest that using 
price mechanisms to allocate scarce water supply is more cost effective than implementing other 
programs for water conservation. It is important to emphasize that the water tax will not solve the 
water allocation problem because it will not directly incentivize water transactions, nor will it 
remedy existing administrative problems.  
In addition to signaling scarcity and promoting conservation, a tax will generate revenues 
that can be used for financing future water projects. The following section addresses the main 
characteristics of the tax and potential scenarios of tax values with their corresponding estimated 
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a) How the tax would work 
1. The tax should vary with water availability  
The most important characteristic of the tax is that it must vary with water availability, 
reflecting the true value of water in the short and long term. This means that the tax should increase 
when there is less water available like in the case of a drought. 
Another feature is that the tax should vary regionally to reflect water availability.  A 
regional drought indicator, the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) can be used as a measure of 
water availability to determine the value of the tax. According to Water Data for Texas (2017) the 
PDSI index is “a meteorological drought index based on recent precipitation and temperature and 
is used to assess the severity of dry or wet spells of weather.” The PDSI generally varies between 
-6 and +6, where negative values denote dry spells. In recent years, the lowest value that the PDSI 
has reached in Texas was in September 2011 in the Low Rolling Plains (-6.99).  
The tax would vary monthly and regionally with the PDSI, which is reported monthly for 
the ten different regions in Texas (see figure 3). This feature will allow the tax to recognize the 
different hydrological conditions of each region and their water availability. An important 
advantage of having a regional tax instead of a statewide tax is that a regional tax will provide 
greater incentives to conserve in the most drought-prone regions.  
Figure 3: Texas Regions for PDSI 
 
Source: Water Data for Texas – PDSI October 2016 
 24 
 
SURFACE WATER REGULATION IN TEXAS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
2. Exceptions and Discounts 
The proposed tax contemplates three major exemptions. The first exception excludes applying 
the tax to the area managed by the Rio Grande Watermaster region, which has a functioning water 
market. The second exemption excludes 1AF of water per month to all permit holders. This 
exemption reduces the impact and administration burden on small users. In addition, the proposed 
tax offers an 80% discount for agricultural users. Charging a lower tax for agricultural users is 
justified by the theory of optimal commodity taxation of Ramsey (1927). This theory suggests that 
in order to minimize the “deadweight loss” of a tax, the tax rates should be lower for more elastic 
commodities and higher for those more inelastic uses (Gruber, 2013). Since agricultural users tend 
to be more price responsive17 than municipal users, they should face a lower tax.  
3. Payment options and enforcement mechanisms  
In order to facilitate payments and revenue collection, all water users will have access to an 
online account where they will report their monthly water consumption to the TCEQ, who will act 
as the tax collector18. This account will show the tax rate for that month and the total amount owed 
by the user. Consumers will be able to pay their accrued bill once a year in order to minimize 
transaction and administrative costs.  
Additionally, to allow users to plan ahead, all users will be able to access a prediction of the 
value of the tax for their region for the current month.  
The main enforcement mechanism for the tax consists of applying extremely high penalties for 
those that are caught diverting water without reporting it. If the penalty is high enough, this should 
incentivize water users to report accurately. 
b) Tax formula and estimation of scenarios 
The main objective of the tax is to reflect the true scarcity of water, and thereby encourage the 
optimal level of conservation. The proposed tax can be calculated using Equation 1. This equation 
shows that the value of the tax depends on three factors: i) the numerator (𝑌), ii) a fixed parameter 
(𝑍) in the denominator, and iii) the PDSI. After simulating with different parameter numbers, we 
use a value of 7.1 for 𝑍 which in absolute values is slightly larger than the lowest PDSI (during 
                                                     
17 According to a review of studies by Diaz et al. (2000), the range of elasticities estimated for agricultural users can be over 1, suggesting that 
agricultural can be elastic to water prices. On the contrary, elasticities estimations for other users suggest that they are mostly inelastic to water 
prices.  
18 The funds could be used for general revenue purposes or earmarked for special purposes 
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the drought of 2011). We have calculated three base scenarios with values of 𝑌 of 50, 100, and 




                                                           Equation 1 
Where 𝑇𝑎𝑥, represents the water tax per AF for a region 𝑟 in a month 𝑡. The tax for 
agricultural users will follow the same equation but be only 20% of the calculated value generated 
by Equation 1. 
We estimate the corresponding tax values, water conservation and revenue that would have been 
generated in the period 2010 – 2016 for the nine19 regions in Texas.  
1. Tax values 
The estimation of the tax that each region would have faced since 2010 show two important 
points. The first is that the tax structure allows the value to vary considerably with water 
availability and that the starting value of the tax has an important effect in the average values and 
level of variability of the tax. Based on the period January 2010- January 2017, the statewide 
average tax with Y= 100 would have been about $26/AF and varied from a low of $7/AF to a high 
of $909/AF in one month. If the value of Y were set at 50, the above numbers would be halved 
and if Y = 200, the above numbers would be doubled.    
The variability of the tax with water availability is also showed graphically as the tax values 
dramatically increase in 2011(the year of the drought) for all staring values and the values 
decrease in wet years like 2016 (See Figure 4). 
The second important conclusion from these estimations is that most of the time, when water 
is abundant, the tax is relatively low. Whereas, during drought conditions the value of the tax can 
reach very large values, which is a desireable feature of the tax. If water is scarce, it should cost 
more to encourage consumers to conserve. Although the tax can reach high values, these peaks 
rarely occur, and the majority of the regions would face low tax values each month since 2010. 
For a Y=100, 83.3% of tax values would have been less or equal to $30 per AF20. Conversely, 
the tax exceeded $100/AF in only 2.2% of the cases. 
                                                     
19 As the Rio Grande is exempted from the fee, the estimations exclude the Trans Pecos regions, which means that estimations are done only for 
9 of the 10 regions.  
20 For a starting value of $50, 91% of the tax values would have been below $20 per AF and for a starting value of $200, 73.7% of the tax values 
would have below $50 per AF. 
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Figure 4: Tax Values by Region (2010 – Jan 2017) Y=100
 
Source: Capstone Team Estimations 
 
The value of the water tax will not have a significant burden on Texas families. For example, 
a family of four21, would have to pay an additional $11.80 per year for an average tax of $26.37 
(Y=100). This means that for a family that is paying $3 per 1,000 gallons it represents an increase 
in their annual bill of 2.7%22. During drought periods when the tax exceeds $100/AF, their average 
monthly bill would increase by $10.50 per month (which represents a 29% increase of their 
                                                     
21 According to the EPA (2017) an average family of four uses 400 gallons of water per day.  
22 In addition, the tax will not become a large burden for agricultural users. For example, a tax with a Y=100 results in average tax for agricultural 
users of $2.67 per AF which represents a price increase of 5% relative to the LCRA prices for interruptible contracts. 
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monthly bill) providing a strong incentive to conserve.  While this is a substantial increase over 
the 2010-2017, it occurred in only 2.2% of the cases. 
2. Water Conservation  
Applying a water tax will allow users to face the real scarcity cost of water in their region, 
which will result in water conservation. This means that the tax will achieve one of its objectives, 
which is to reduce water consumption, especially in drought conditions like 2011. Based on the 
values of the tax previously calculated, we can estimate the percentage of reduction in water 
consumption for each month. Equation 2, shows that water conservation depends on the price 
elasticity of demand for water, the value of the tax and the original water price.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (%) = 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥 (
𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
) x 100%                   Equation 3 
For this estimation, the short run water price elasticity23 used is 0.38. This means that 
increasing water prices by 10% would reduce water usage by 3.8%. For water prices in Equation 
2, we used LCRA current water rates. ($14524 for firm water used and $49.8825 for agricultural 
(interruptible) water).  The conservation estimates differentiate between agricultural users and 
nonagricultural users to account for different original prices and difference in the values of the tax. 
Figure 5 shows what the conservation (in percentage points) trends would have been since 2010 if 
the tax was applied. As expected, the amount of water saved each year depends on the value of the 
tax which in turn depends on drought conditions. Water conservation is higher during droughts 
due to the tax increase.  
Water conservation resulting from the tax can be equivalent to increasing water supply by a 
certain percentage as it decreases the water deficit. For instance, in 2011 a tax with a 𝑌 = 100 
would have been equivalent to an increase in supply of surface water by 20% for nonagricultural 





                                                     
23 See M. Espey, J. Espey, and W. D. Shaw (1997) and Bell & Griffin (2005). 
24 LCRA, Water Supply Contracts, http://www.lcra.org/water/water-supply/water-supply-contracts/Pages/default.aspx 
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Figure 5: Percentage of water conservation across all regions (2010 – Jan 2017) 
(Y=100) 
 
Source: Capstone Team Estimations 
Conservation arising from the water tax can have an important long run impact. The TWDB 
estimates that due to an increase in demand and slight decrease in surface water supply, the deficit 
of water in 2070 would be 8.9 million AF per year. Based on the tax conservation estimations and 
the prediction of surface water availability in 2070, we can estimate how much water could have 
been saved relative to the 2070 deficit. The average water savings for non-agricultural users based 
on the estimations of the period 2010 to 2017 is 7% and for agricultural users is 4%. Assuming 
that the percentage of conservation of 2070 equals these averages, we estimate that the total 
conservation would represent 7.4% of the water deficit of that year26 (8.9 million AF).   While the 
conservation effects during hypothesized “normal conditions” is not as large as during a drought, 
one should focus on the conservation potential during drought conditions, which as shown in 
Figure 5 would have been quite large in 2011. 
3. Estimated Tax Revenue 
The revenue estimation intends to provide a general idea of how much revenue would be 
generated for Y=100. The estimated revenues are calculated using the average tax of the year, 
multiplied by the amount of diversion from surface water.27  
                                                     
26 This percentage is calculated assuming an elasticity of -0.38, but literature suggest that elasticities increase in the long run. Consequently there 
could be a larger conservation in the future that the current estimation.  
27 The amount of water diverted is calculated as the sum of monthly diversions (accounting for the 1AF exemption) and not accounting for the 
water diverted from the Rio Grande. Since no data was available for 2015 and 2016, we assumed that the diversion in this two years were equal to 
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In a wet year, like 2015, a tax with Y=100 would result in a revenue of $224 million which 
would have represented 27.1% of the operating budgets of the TCEQ and TWDB combined in 
201528. In a dry year, like 2011, a tax based on Y=100 would result in a revenue of $1.5 billion-- 
twice  the operating budgets of the TCEQ and TWDB combined in 2011.   
 
D. Create a Water Market 
A water market is a comprehensive solution that will solve both the water pricing problem 
(underpriced and inflexible), and the water allocation problem. First, a water market would solve 
the underpricing problem arising from the lack of a scarcity premium. With a market, water prices 
will respond to water scarcity, but their usefulness will be particularly significant in times of 
drought. Higher prices signal the scarcity of water to economic agents, creating incentives for 
water conservation. Secondly, a market will solve the allocation problem, encouraging water to 
move to its highest valued use. If owners of groundwater and surface water permits can sell their 
water, they will voluntarily respond by selling it for higher valued uses.  As noted in the previous 
section, there is currently no active water market to allow water to move to its highest valued uses, 
despite the existence of river basins that could serve as major water highways.  
Creating a viable water market in Texas will not be easy.  At least four impediments have 
blocked its development. In order to facilitate a water market in Texas, four necessary steps must 
be taken. The first step consists of increasing the amount of water in the system available for trade 
by changing restrictions on river authority’s pricing, return flows, and take or pay contracts. The 
second step consists of allowing water transfers between surface and groundwater, enabling 
groundwater to substitute for scarce surface water especially during droughts. The third step is to 
facilitate interbasin transfers, which have not been occurring despite abundant supplies in East 
Texas. The fourth and final step is to promote intra-basin transfers to make better use of our river 
basins as water highways transferring water to its highest valued use. Conceptually, this is the 
toughest of the four steps to solve so we consider three alternative administrative solutions.  They 
include (1) speeding up the TCEQ permit process, (2) implementing more Watermasters and (3) 
experimenting with a new Watermaster Lite system. The details of the solutions are described 
below.  
                                                     
that of 2014. The data was obtained from the Water Use Data 2000 – 2014 from TCEQ Website: 
https://www.tceq.texas.gov/permitting/water_rights/wr-permitting/wrwud.  
28 For the values of TCEQ and TWDB expenditures see Comptroller Office (2017). 
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Step 1: Increasing the Amount of Water Available for Trade:  
a) Encourage More Flexible Pricing by River Authorities  
As mentioned in the problems section, inflexible water pricing results in a lack of 
conservation. While this issue would be addressed by the previously mentioned water tax, river 
authorities play a key role in setting long term fixed prices. More innovative price setting 
mechanisms need to be developed. We suggest two main strategies to allow river authorities to 
set flexible water prices that will fluctuate with  
Where uncommitted supplies exist, encourage river authorities to maintain an emergency pool 
to be auctioned off during droughts.  
If river authorities are allowed to auction uncommitted supplies during a drought, an 
auction would assure that these emergency supplies went to their most efficient use. The idea of 
emergency supplies is similar to electric utilities maintaining peak load capacity.  Peak load 
pricing has a long history of being applied to regulated public electric power producers and could 
be utilized for water as well.   
Even in long term contracts, encourage river authorities to introduce automatic r price 
escalators that would be triggered as reservoir storage falls below certain threshold levels.  
It is quite common for river authorities to enter into long term, fixed price contracts that 
guarantee a buyer water for 30 or more years. Because of this long span of time, major droughts 
will surely occur during the duration of the contract. During such periods, it is critical that prices 
rise so as to encourage conservation.  The idea is simple.  Set some threshold of reservoir 
capacity (e.g. 50%).  As storage falls below this threshold, the prices would automatically 
escalate by a predetermined formula.  If municipalities were aware of this provision, they could 
inform their customers, encourage conservation, and help mitigate the effects of the drought.  
b) More Efficient Use of Return Flows 
The 2017 Texas State Water plan predicts that reuse water management strategies will 
produce 723,000 AF per year per by 2070, accounting for 14 percent of total water supplies 
(TWDB 2017). However, the amount of water generated from reuse in 2020 will only amount to 
four percent of the total water supplies. Clearly, a large deficit exists between the current figures 
on reuse and the predicted amount of water to be supplied by reuse in the future. Indirect reuse and 
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increased utilization of return flows are critical for meeting these 2070 goals and increasing the 
future total water supplies.  
Currently, the uncertainty surrounding ownership of groundwater return flows and the 
TCEQ permitting process prevent indirect reuse from becoming a viable strategy to augment future 
water supplies.  
 Solution for groundwater return flows: Ownership of groundwater return flows should be 
automatically maintained  
 Many groundwater owners have not actively sought to maintain ownership of their return 
flows. This makes effluent groundwater worthless to the discharger and prevents the marketing of 
this resource. Because the discharger must seek TCEQ approval, transaction costs associated with 
filing and receiving authorization may outweigh the benefits of owning the return flows.  Instead, 
if ownership of return flows from groundwater was automatically maintained with no necessity 
for permitting, dischargers would have a greater incentive to return effluent to waterways so they 
can potentially market these return flows downstream. Amending the Texas Water Code allowing 
for automatic authorization of groundwater return flows would have positive implications for 
water markets as well as for increased environmental flows. The amended water code should 
require the discharger provide notice of the points of discharge and diversion, and the rate and 
volume of the discharge and subsequent diversion.  
Solution for surface water return flows: Ownership should reside with buyer and original 
priority date of the water right should apply  
Another issue is the permitting process of surface water return flows. If a water right permit 
holder wants to utilize or sell surface water-based effluent returned to a river or stream, they must 
have a reuse permit or obtain a bed and banks permit. Currently, prior appropriation further 
complicates this process. If a right holder seeks a permit for return flows after their initial water 
right, or amends certain permit characteristics of an existing reuse permit, their permit may be 
issued a new priority date instead of reflecting the original priority date of the water right.  
Allowing the priority date for a reuse permit to remain the same on permit amendments 
will incentivize right holders to utilize access to their return flows. If an amendment significantly 
changes priority date, some dischargers may avoid this process due to greater restrictions placed 
on a more junior priority date during times of drought and for environmental flows. Regardless of 
when the return flow permit is issued, permits should retain the original priority date.  
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c) Current Take-or-pay contracts encourage waste 
As stated in the problem section, take or pay contracts prevent conservation. Since buyers 
pay for water regardless of whether to use it or not, they are inclined to use the full amount of 
water, as allocated on their contract. Thus, they have no incentive to conserve.  
Solution: Allow all take-or-pay contract buyers the ability to resell their unused contracted water 
 If contracted water buyers could resell their unused contract water, they would have an 
incentive to conserve water. This policy option encourages municipalities to conserve water and 
participate in the market, where water will reach its highest valued user. 
 
Step 2:  Conjunctive Use of Surface Water and Ground Water  
Another fundamental issue in Texas is that groundwater and surface water resources are 
not managed conjunctively. In some Texas regions, groundwater may be abundant whereas surface 
water is scarce. In other areas, surface water maybe plentiful with fewer groundwater resources. 
Texas water policy fails to recognize the interchangeable nature of groundwater and surface water, 
preventing an integrated market from developing. 
Current case law provides precedent and continues to support strong property rights for 
ground water29,30. Yet, regulatory barriers prevent groundwater and surface water from moving to 
its highest valued beneficial use.  
Solution: Eliminate usage based regulations by the GCDs and TCEQ. 
Groundwater owners should be able to utilize the water they own, as long as it is used for 
a beneficial use set forth by the Chapter 11 of the Texas Water Code31 . If groundwater is going 
towards a beneficial use as specified by the Texas Water Code, there should be no further 
regulation on when and where a water right holder can use their water. One set of commentators 
explained that rule of capture has been greatly modified and skewed through the years, but the 
balance between GCD’s and private ownership of the water as a property right, while delicate, still 
demonstrates property ownership as a priority (37 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1 2004-2005).    
This should extend to surface water as well. If a permit holder is simply changing the use 
of surface water from one beneficial use to another, at least when the use is not more consumptive, 
                                                     
29
 Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).   
30 City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955). 
31 Texas Water Code Chapter 11 defines “beneficial use” to include:  domestic and municipal, agricultural and industrial, mining, hydroelectric, 
navigation, recreation and pleasure, public parks and game preserves. 
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the TCEQ approval process should not be required.  Allowing changes in water usage will facilitate 
a water market and allow water to move from lower valued uses to higher valued uses. 
   
Step 3:  Eliminate Junior Rights Provision restricting Interbasin Transfers 
As previously mentioned, water resources in Texas are not evenly distributed across the 
state. Water transfers from areas with substantial water supplies to areas where water is very 
scarce, are necessary for efficient water allocation. Senate Bill 1’s so-called “junior rights” 
provision is a major impediment to interbasin transfers. This provision mandates that a senior water 
right holder who participates in an interbasin transfer will lose their original priority date, 
becoming junior to all other water right holders in the basin. Because Texas follows the prior 
appropriation system, meaning “first in time, first in right”, senior rights are particularly valuable 
as they are the least likely to be cut off during times of drought (WGA 2012). Because water rights 
are devalued when they are made “more junior”, the junior provision disincentives both right 
holders from selling their water and buyers from purchasing a right they know will be more 
vulnerable to drought in the future. This section offers two solutions to promote interbasin 
transfers.  
Solution: The junior provision must be eliminated to encourage interbasin transfers.  
If interbasin transfers do occur, another issue arises concerning compensation for the area 
of origin (i.e. the water basin that will transfer water to a different location). In all western states, 
the most important criteria for approval or rejection of a request for water right transfer is the “no 
injury” rule (WGA 2012). This means changing existing water rights should not produce negative 
externalities for other vested water rights. Even if Senate Bill 1 requirements are eliminated, the 
negative impacts on the area of origin must be solved. 
Solution: Texas should utilize mitigation funds and arbitration to compensate the area of origin 
for interbasin transfers 
 River basins and communities in Texas should utilize an arbitrator to create their own 
context-specific mitigation funds.  There are several examples of successful mitigation funds in 
other states. For example, in the Metropoliintan Water District (MWD) and Palo Verdo Valley 
Irrigation District’s (PVID) interbasin water contract, the MWD provides a Community 
Involvement Fund (CIF). The CIF compensates the area of origin in the form of training programs 
for community members, support for small business, and cash per AF of water diverted (WGA, 
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2012). In Nevada, areas of origin simply impose a $10 fee per AF on all water that is transferred 
out of the county (WSWC, 2012).  These solutions can be applied in Texas. 
  
Step 4: Intrabasin transfers  
Even within a river basin, it is difficult to change points of diversion to move water to its 
highest valued uses. This is especially true for intra-basin transfers, as the water right amendment 
process is time-consuming and expensive. From 2013 to 2016, there was a 55% increase in the 
days it took to process a water permit application. This is problematic in that without intra-basin 
transfers, water will not be able to reach its highest valued use and will continue to have an 
undervalued price. This section addresses three potential solutions that aim to (i) speed up the 
TCEQ permitting process to facilitate more transfers (ii) encouraging more Watermasters and (iii) 
experimenting with Watermaster Lite systems.  
Solution:  Option 1. Speed up the TCEQ water permitting process by automatically processing 
a permit application if there is only a change in the purpose of use or an additional new use 
added onto the permit, as long as it falls within one of the seven beneficial surface water uses32; 
allow the TCEQ to automatically process environmental flow applications; and use Web. 2.0 
forum platforms to allow water right holders to submit their concerns, comments, and questions.  
Texas law states a water right amendment must be authorized for change in the place of 
use, purpose of use, point of diversion, rate of diversion, acreage to be irrigated, and any other use 
of the water33. Our solution eliminates technical reviews and public notice for permit amendments 
that are solely changing their purpose of use or adding a secondary purpose of use. Such requests 
would only require an administrative check for all the components of the application.   
For example, if Permit A has an agricultural and industrial permit, but wants to add a 
domestic and municipal use, then Permit A would submit all of the information needed on the 
permit application. The TCEQ would check to ensure that the permit was complete and then 
automatically authorize this transaction, without running a technical review or issuing a public 
notice.  
                                                     
32 Texas Water Code §11.024 defines beneficial uses as domestic and municipal, agricultural and industrial, mining, 
hydroelectric power, navigation, recreation, and “other beneficial uses”. 
33 Idi. § 11.122(a) 
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The mechanism to allow for the purchase of environmental flows should also be 
streamlined. Under this solution, a permit holder would be able to lease or sell his/her water for 
environmental flows without undergoing the TCEQ technical review or public notice. As this 
water would stay in the river, there is no permit holder negatively affected by this transaction and 
has immense benefits for the ecosystem of the river.  
Lastly, Web 2.0 platforms allow viewers to interact with the webhost to receive 
information, ask questions, and receive answers. In the public notice process, all affected water 
right holders have the right to state their concerns and ask the TCEQ questions about a pending 
amendment or permit. This process could be streamlined by utilizing Web 2.0 technologies. This 
is better elaborated with an example. 
Currently, if Permit A has a question regarding how the pending water amendment will 
affect the flow of the river, he/she must call, email, attend a public forum, or mail his/her question. 
The TCEQ then answers his/her question. Suppose permit B holder has the exact same question 
and goes through the same process and then the TCEQ also answers his/her question individually. 
However, if there were a forum for water right holders to post their questions, then Permit A would 
utilize the forum to ask his/her question and the TCEQ would answer them within the forum. 
Thereafter, rather than Permit B calling the TCEQ individually, he/she would have the answer 
because it is already answered in the forum.   
 However, it should be noted that even with these three changes implemented, the TCEQ 
permit amendment process might not be quick enough to facilitate market transactions especially 
during droughts. For example, during the 2011 drought, DOW Chemical made a senior call in the 
Brazos River to curtail junior water right holders from withdrawing water.  The TCEQ curtailed 
water withdraws for every junior right holder in the basin, but made exceptions for municipalities 
and electric companies. Since there is so much bureaucratic red tape within the water transfer and 
leasing process, municipalities and electric companies had limited methods to obtain water for 
their citizen’s water and electric needs. Thus, the TCEQ usurped property rights to deal with the 
emergency. Under the framework of a market, junior water right holders, such as municipalities 
and electric companies, could have bought water from senior water right holders if temporary 
changes in diversion points could be quickly approved by the TCEQ. Skepticism whether the 
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Solution: Option 2. Implement a Watermaster in basins where there is more water scarcity  
The key benefit to a Watermaster System is that it protects private property rights by 
regulating water diversions. Under the Watermaster System, water right holders are required to 
report their water diversions. Daily monitors patrol the basin to ensure that the accurate amount of 
water is reported, and that no illegal diversions are taking place. The Watermaster System also 
provides information on daily water levels, which allows consumers to have full information about 
how much water is in the river and who can divert.  
 As water in a particular basin becomes more scarce, it is essential to have a Watermaster 
to perform regular inspections to ensure protection of water rights. If there is lack of compliance 
under the Watermaster System, the Watermaster can prevent the water right holder from diverting 
and storing water. Watermasters effectively make use of the scarce water resource prudently. They 
provide an unbiased avenue for all permit holders in the basin to make use of the water in an 
efficient way.   
 The Watermaster actively collects information about river flow rates, who is diverting, and 
how much, thus they have full information about how much water is in the river on a given day. 
This allows all permit holders to have full information about how much of their right they own on 
a daily basis.  
Watermasters allow for a more efficient system. Since every water right holder has to 
purchase a flow gauge and regularly report their water diversions, it allows the Watermaster to 
maintain a detailed analysis of river stream flows and keep up-to-date information. They can also 
allow for changes in diversions in an expeditious manner, allowing water to move from lower 
valued uses to higher valued uses.   
More importantly, Watermasters have been very successful in Texas. The Rio Grande 
Watermaster is an example of a broadly proclaimed Watermaster System. However, the fact that 
it does not operate under the prior appropriation doctrine makes it easier to administer. Outside of 
the Rio Grande, Texas has three other operational Watermaster Systems: The South Texas 
Watermaster, the Concho River Watermaster, and most recently the Brazos Watermaster, which 
demonstrates that watermasters can work efficiently even under the Prior Appropriation Doctrine. 
Despite their effectiveness in managing water rights, there has been pushback from constituents 
because (i) they are costly to administer and (ii) for some water right holders the benefits do not 
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outweigh the costs. However, as water becomes more scarce the necessity of enforcing property 
rights becomes more pertinent.  The popularity of Watermaster Systems seems likely to grow. 
Solution: Option 3. Consider a Watermaster Lite System for basins where water resources are 
more abundant 
The goal of the Watermaster Lite System is to ensure that water can be transferred quickly 
by bypassing some of the regulatory burdens set forth by the TCEQ permitting process, but do so 
at a much lower cost than a full-blown Watermaster System. The Watermaster Lite System should 
be tried on an experimental basis to ensure it is effective before being implemented elsewhere. 
This system is intended to dramatically shorten the TCEQ processing time, increase market 
transactions, reduce transaction costs, and require less financial resources to administer than the 
traditional Watermaster System.    
a) How to implement the Watermaster Lite? 
The river will be divided into segments and each segment will have flow detectors installed 
to measure stream flow. The basin’s water right holders will then be divided and assigned a color 
based upon seniority and their permitted acre-feet. This will require the TCEQ to calculate all of 
the total water permits in the basin based off of their acre-feet withdrawal limits. For example, in 
the Brazos River basin there is a total of 7,932,481 AF allocated to divert. Thereafter, water right 
holders would be divided into five groups. The most senior quintile of the 1,983,120 AF would be 
categorized into the color “black”; the second most senior quintile of the 1,983,120 AF would be 
categorized in the color “red”; the third set of junior diverters will be categorized into “orange”; 
the next quintile would be “yellow”; and the most junior 1,983,120 AF would be categorized into 
“green”. Under this system, the whole river basin will be grouped by the acre footage and seniority 
of its diverters. Additionally, each river segment will be assigned a minimum flow rate would be 
set for black, red, orange, yellow, and green permit holders. 
This system aims to create a spot market based off of short-term (less than a year) changes 
in diversions that will be automatically granted provided three conditions are met. (i) The first 
condition is the flow rate in their river segment and permit type is satisfied within a 10% margin 
of error.  (The flow rate will incorporate environmental flows for water rights issued post Senate 
Bill 3.) A second condition is (ii) The permit change in diversion will incorporate stream flow 
losses (including evaporation effects).  For example, if the original permit called for a diversion 
rate of 10 AF daily and there was a 10% evaporation and transportation loss, the recipient would 
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only be entitled to divert 9 AF daily. (iii) The permit would be subject to curtailment in the event 
of a senior right call.  
Once the river is properly divided, there will be monthly flow requirements that must be 
maintained for the run of the river and environmental flows. Thereafter, the flow requirements will 
be updated using the data collected from detectors. This will determine who can divert water based 
on the monthly stream flow. A monthly color will then be allocated to show the water right holder 
in the basin who can withdraw and trade water. This will enable buyers and sellers to effectively 
trade water, which will allow for a market to function, which is especially crucial during periods 
of drought 
Table 2 
Flow requirement (Cubic 




More than 2362 100% 2001 to 2016 Green 
Between 2000 and 2362 80% 1976 to 2000  
Between 936 and 1563 60% 1951 to 1975 Orange 
Between 936 and 1563 40% 1925 to 1950 Red 
Less than 936         20%        1883 to 1924              Black 
 
This system is better stated with an example. Diverter A, from Figure 6, is the most senior 
water right holder in the basin and is allowed to divert 100 AF annually. Thereby, Diverter A is 
assigned the color “Black”, which means he/she can divert water even when the flows are less than 
936,000 cfs. However, Diverter B, is a more junior water right holder and assigned the color 
“Yellow”, which indicates that when the flow rates are below 2000 cfs, he/she cannot divert water. 
In this scenario, Diverter B is no longer allowed to divert water, however Diverter B needs an 
additional 75 AF for his/her crops. While, Diverter A, only needs 25 AF. Since Diverter A has a 
senior water right and is not using all of his/her allocated share of water, under this system Diverter 
A could lease the remaining 75 AF to Diverter B.  Such transactions would be allowed to take 
place on a monthly basis. For example, for a 30 day transfers, annual rate would be prorated to the 
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Figure 6 
 
The Watermaster Lite system is proposed as an experimental option.  Its application would 
no doubt require additional adjustments, and should first be refined for a particular river basin with 
abundant water. The system would also need adjustments for periods of drought. To succeed 
during a drought, the Watermaster Lite System must be cheap to administer and have the flexibility 
to allow temporary changes in diversion points.  
 The attraction of the Watermaster Lite System is that it retains many of the features of a 
Watermaster System, but would be potentially cheaper to operate and would have desirable self-
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